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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
JOAN WILLIAMSON, ] 
Petitioner/Appellant, ] 
vs. ] 
STUART KIM WILLIAMSON, ] 
Respondent/Appellee. ) 
) Case No. 980245-CA 
> Trial Court No. 954100207 DA 
Priority No. 15 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter 
pursuant to the Constitution of Utah, Article VIII, Section 1 et, 
seg, Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (2) (h), and Rules 3 and 4 of the 
Utah Rules of Appellant Procedure. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court commit error in failing to make 
findings on nearly all material issues, including: 
A. Whether Stuart Williamson's $3,550.00 gross per 
month income at the time of his involuntary termination from 
Morton International, Inc. due to unsatisfactory job 
performance should be imputed to Stuart Williamson for 
purposes of child support and alimony; 
B. Whether Stuart Williamson is voluntarily 
underemployed at $11.00 per hour when there is allegedly 
employment available to him at $13.00 to $15.00 per hour; 
C. The effect of a new spouse's contributions to 
Stuart Williamson's household on Stuart Williamson's needs 
and ability to pay alimony; 
D. The parties' needs and respective abilities to meet 
those needs relative to alimony, and equalization of the 
parties' respective standards of living; and 
E. The reasonableness of Joan Williamson's attorneys 
fees and costs and the relative abilities of the parties to 
pay attorneys fees and costs. 
2. Did the trial court commit error in failing to award 
Joan Williamson continued alimony even based upon the trial 
court's findings of $2,090.00 gross monthly income to Stuart 
Williamson and $1,692.00 gross monthly income to Joan Williamson 
representing a $400.00 per month gross income disparity. 
3. Did the trial court commit error in failing to award 
Joan Williamson her attorneys fees and costs. 
4. Whether Joan Williamson should be awarded her attorneys 
fees and costs on appeal. 
APPLICABLE STATUES 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.6(6) and (7): 
(6) Gross income includes income imputed to the parent 
under Subsection (7). 
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(7) (a) Income may not be imputed to a parent unless 
the parent stipulates to the amount imputed or a 
hearing is held and a finding made that the parent is 
voluntarily unemployed or underemployed, 
(b) If income is imputed to a parent, the income shall 
be based upon employment potential and probable 
earnings as derived from work history, occupation 
qualifications, and prevailing earnings for persons of 
similar backgrounds in the community. 
(c) If a parent has no recent work history, income 
shall be imputed at least at the federal minimum wage 
for a 40-hour work week. To impute a greater income, 
the judge in a judicial proceeding or the presiding 
officer in an administrative proceeding shall enter 
specific findings of fact as to the evidentiary basis 
for the imputation. 
(d) Income may not be imputed if any of the following 
conditions exist: 
(i) the reasonable costs of child care for 
the parents7 minor children approach or equal the 
amount of income the custodial parent can earn; 
(ii) a parent is physically or mentally 
disabled to the extent he cannot earn minimum 
wage; 
(iii) a parent is engaged in career or 
occupational training to establish basic job 
skills; or 
(iv) unusual emotional or physical needs of 
a child require the custodial parent's presence in 
the home. 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5 (7) (a), (d) and (g): 
(7) (a) The court shall consider at least the 
following factors in determining alimony: 
(i) the financial condition and needs of the 
recipient spouse; 
(ii) the recipient's earning capacity or 
ability to produce income; 
(iii) the ability of the payor spouse to 
provide support; and 
(iv) the length of the marriage. 
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(d) The court may, under appropriate circumstances, 
attempt to equalize the parties7 respective standards 
of living. 
(g) (i) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make 
substantive changes and new orders regarding alimony 
based on a substantial material change in circumstances 
not foreseeable at the time of the divorce. 
(ii) The court may not modify alimony or 
issue a new order for alimony to address needs of 
the recipient that did not exist at the time the 
decree was entered, unless the court finds 
extenuating circumstances that justify that 
action. 
(iii) In determining alimony, the income of 
any subsequent spouse of the payor may not be 
considered, except as provided in this subsection. 
A. The court may consider the 
subsequent spouse's financial ability to 
share living expenses. 
B. The court may consider the income or 
a subsequent spouse if the court finds that 
the payor's improper conduct justifies that 
consideration. 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-3 (1): 
(1) In any action filed under Title 30, Chapter 
3, 4 or 6, and in any action to establish an order of 
custody, visitation, child support, alimony, or 
division of property in a domestic case, the court may 
order a party to pay the costs, attorney fees, and 
witness fees, including expert witness fees, of the 
other party to enable the other party to prosecute or 
defend the action. The order may include provision for 
costs of the action. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case, This is a case involving 
modification of the child support provision and termination of 
the alimony provision of a Decree of Divorce. 
B. Course of Proceedings. The parties were divorced by 
Decree of Divorce entered May 2, 1996. On or about September 27, 
1996, Stuart Williamson filed a Petition to Modify the child 
support provisions of the Decree of Divorce. On or about October 
3, 1997, Stuart Williamson filed an Amended Petition to Modify 
seeking termination of the alimony provided in the Decree of 
Divorce. Trial was held on Stuart Williamson's petition on 
February 11, 1998. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and 
Order Modifying the Decree of Divorce were entered March 25, 
1998. Joan Williamson filed her Notice of Appeal on April 22, 
1998. Copies are found in the Brief of Joan Williamson. 
C. Disposition in the Trial Court: Finding that Stuart 
Williamson's income was different than at the time of the entry 
of the Decree of Divorce, the trial court found a "change in 
circumstances", reduced child support, terminated alimony, and 
ordered each party to pay their own attorneys fees and costs. 
D. Statement of Facts Relevant to the Issues Presented for 
Review: 
1. Joan Williamson and Stuart Williamson were married for 
twenty-three (23) plus years. The parties have two children, one 
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of whom, Julie, is still a minor, born on September 23, 1985 and 
in the custody of Joan Williamson. R. 48, 66, 67 and 82. T. 
page 130, lines 2-4. 
2. Joan Williamson and Stuart Williamson were divorced by 
a Decree of Divorce entered on the 24th day of May, 1996. R. 82-
96. A copy of the Decree of Divorce is included in the 
Appellant's Addendum. The Decree of Divorce was based upon a 
Stipulation of the parties. R. 47-65. 
3. The Decree of Divorce provided for child support and 
alimony as follows: 
4. [Stuart Williamson] shall pay to [Joan Williamson] 
the sum of $368.00 per month as child support until such 
time as the payments are no longer due, which shall be when 
the child turns 18 or would graduate from high school with 
her normal high school class, whichever occurs later 
6. [Stuart Williamson] shall maintain health, medical 
and dental insurance on the minor child of the parties 
8. [Stuart Williamson] is required to pay [Joan 
Williamson] alimony in the sum of $425.00 per month until 
[Joan Williamson] remarries or cohabits as defined in Utah 
Code § 30-3-5, or either party dies. Alimony shall commence 
July 1, 1995. 
R. 83-85. 
4* At the time of the divorce, Stuart Williamson, was 
employed at Morton International, Inc. where he earned 
approximately $3,550.00 gross per month. Joan Williamson was 
employed at Bourns where she earned approximately $1,442.00 gross 
per month. R. 61, 77 and 92. T. page 12, lines 13-24. 
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5. On or about September 27, 1996, Stuart Williamson filed 
a Petition to Modify and reduce the child support provisions of 
the Decree of Divorce. R. 116-20. On or about October 3, 1997, 
Stuart Williamson filed an Amended Petition to Modify which added 
a request to modify by reducing or terminating the alimony 
provision of the Decree of Divorce. R. 141-467. 
6. Stuart Williamson was involuntarily terminated from his 
employment at Morton International, Inc. by a letter dated August 
29, 1996, which stated the reason for termination to be a 
"violation of Company Policy; specifically unsatisfactory 
performance of job responsibilities." The letter also stated 
that Stuart Williamson could request review of his termination: 
"If you are dissatisfied with any aspect of your termination, you 
may review the Morton Automotive Safety Products Employee 
Handbook as it pertains to the Employee Grievance Process." 
Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 4; T. page 12, line 25; page 13, lines 
1-3; page 16, lines 2-6; page 16, lines 19-25; page 17; page 18, 
lines 1-5; page 23, lines 13-25; pages 24-32; page 33, lines 1-9; 
page 95, lines 18-25; page 96; page 97, lines 1-3. 
7. Stuart Williamson testified that he did not slur his 
co-workers in August 1996 and that he felt there was not 
justification for Morton International, Inc. to terminate his 
employment. T. page 30, lines 3-25; pages 31-34. Three co-
workers testified that they did not personally hear Stuart 
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Williamson slur his co-workers in August, 1996. T. page 97, 
lines 18-25; pages 98-119; page 120, lines 1-21. 
8. Stuart Williamson testified that he did not seek review 
of his termination nor seek legal redress because he didn't think 
it would do any good. T. page 77, lines 21-25; page 78, lines 1-
17. 
9. Stuart Williamson obtained new employment with his 
brother's drywall company where he is paid $11.00 per hour. T. 
page 36, lines 1-5. 
10. Stuart Williamson, and his brother, Kirk Williamson for 
whom Stuart works, testified that because of age and health 
concerns, Stuart Williamson was not as productive as he once was, 
but earned his $11 an hour. T. page 14, lines 16-25; page 15, 
lines 1-20; page 55, lines 9-25, pages 56-57; page 58, lines 1-6; 
page 122, lines 1-22; page 124, lines 24-25; page 125; page 126, 
lines 1-11. 
Mr. Vlahos. Okay. Now in reference to your brother 
would you tell the Court the circumstances surrounding him 
coming to work for you? 
A. He showed up one, one afternoon and asked me for a 
job and said he'd been down to Heaps Drywall. And I said 
sure, I'll put you to work. So I hired him on and he told 
me that, you know, he hasn't drywalled for a while and he's 
not in too good a shape and his shoulder is sore. I mean, 
he was honest with me up front and said I'm not the man I 
used to be. So I started him out at $11 an hour and—. 
Q. Is that what he still earns? 
A. That's what he still earns. And you know, that's 
companies around that, that will pay more and, and I, you 
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know, I'd pay Kim more too but he doesn't, he doesn't know 
how to hang. Well, he can hang but not very efficient. He 
doesn't know how to do metal stud framing. He doesn't know 
how to do T-bar ceiling or, you know, most of Kim's life 
he's been a taper. 
Q. Okay. So are you paying him a salary that would be 
commensurate with a taper? 
A. Yes. 
A. I'm paying him like I would pay anybody else, 
brother or not. It's the way we were raised. If you're 
worth it you get it, if you're not — I can't afford to pay 
him any more. 
Q. Why? 
A. He could go to work somewhere else maybe for two to 
three months and get $13.00 an hour. When the company got 
slow they'd lay him off or when they found out that he 
wasn't cutting it for $13 they'd lay him off. Then he'd go 
to another company. I mean he, he's secure here. I mean, 
he's got a job as, as long as he wants to stay here and can, 
you know, perform. If, if he gets, if his should gets worse 
and he continues to gain weight and can't bend over and do 
his job then he's he's going to be, his price is going down, 
you know, his hourly wage. 
Q. How does, how does bursitis or whatever on his 
shoulder, how does that affect his ability to do the job? 
A. Well he's, his shoulders are not as strong as they 
used to be so he doesn't carry a full hod full of mud 
anymore because he can't hold the weight. 
Q. Okay. 
A. Plus he can't run a full range of motion with his 
trowel cause he's you know, it's just not strong enough and 
capable of pulling it so his, his strokes are limited. And 
you know in, in drywall it's, like I said before it's 
competitive. There's only so much money in the job or 
you're losing money. And sad to say we all get older and 
slow down. 
Q. I hate to say it but you're right. 
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What about carpal tunnel in his wrists? Does that 
affect his job? 
A. It does because his hand go numb. 
Q. Have you seen that happen? 
A. I have. 
Q. On more than one occasion? 
A. Yes. Nearly every day. 
Q. Have you seen the affect that his bursitis and/or 
arthritis has had on his shoulder and his ability to do the 
job? 
A. Yes, I have. 
Q. On more than one occasion? 
A. Yes. 
Q. On a regular basis? 
A. It's a, it's a nearly every day occurrence. And 
it's sad to say. Kim at one time was, was one of the best 
drywall men in the business, extremely talented. I should 
say taper. But he's, he's not the man he used to be. 
Q. These other areas he has no expertise at all I take 
it then. 
A. He's, he's learning how to do it but he's learning 
on a basis of, you know, our pay scale goes from minimum 
wage on up to $15 an hour. But he's, on an average scale 
he's, he's an $8, $9 an hour man if you were to take him in 
a full perspective. 
A. T-bar is just grid ceiling system. Metal stud 
framing is a different aspect of it. So we try to keep Kim 
on taping as much as possible. But we also are branched out 
into stucco exterior where his skills of spreading the mud, 
you know he's, he's still very talented but he's, he's slow. 
Q. Why is that? 
A. Age, bursitis, wrist trouble, overweight. 
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Q. Let me ask you this. Has he worked overtime for 
you? 
A. A couple occasions yes, he has. 
Q. And has he volunteered to do overtime? Has he ever 
refused overtime? Let's put it that way. 
A. No, he hasn't. 
Q. Okay. 
A. I7ve mean Kim is— It's, it's pretty tough for 
him, you know, to— I mean I, when I was growing up Kim 
basically trained me in a lot, in a lot of the parts of 
drywall. And not it's, it's kind of tough for him to, to 
see the younger generation, you know, basically showing him 
up. 
Q. Are you paying him more or less than what he is 
really capable and what he is really capable of doing for 
the job and work that he has? 
A. Kim is, is holding his own at $11 an hour. 
T. pages 122-128. 
11. Joan Williamson's income at Bourns increased from $8.32 
per hour at the time of the divorce (May 1996) to $9.32 per hour 
at the time of the modification trial (February 1998). T. page 
132, lines 12-25; pages 133, line 1. Joan Williamson had some 
overtime at Bourns in 1997. T. page 156, lines 7-14. Joan 
Williamson took an additional part-time job at King's a 
department store, in September, 1997 to supplement her income. 
T. page 141, lines 8-19; page 154 lines 10-25; page 155, lines 1-
19. 
12. At trial, Joan Williamson presented a monthly budget of 
$2,288.35 for herself and the parties' daughter which included 
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her mortgage payment on her new home. Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 9; 
T. page 142, lines 16-25; pages 143-144. 
13. At trial, Stuart Williamson presented a monthly budget 
of $1,811.00 which did not include expenses for his current wife, 
most, if not all of which, were split off by Stuart Williamson, 
during his testimony, on the basis that his current wife could 
pay for her expenses out of her income. Defendant's Exhibit No. 
1; T. page 45, lines 2-25; pages 46-49; page 50, lines 1-22. 
14. The trial court found that "there has been a change of 
circumstances". T. page 180, lines 14-15. 
15. The trial court found Stuart Williamson's gross income 
at Williamson Drywall, Inc. to be $2,090.00 per month, which 
would include overtime of $200.00 per month. T. page 44, lines 
4-9. R. 197 (Findings of Fact, numbered paragraph 7); T. page 
180, lines 16-18. 
16. The trial court found Joan Williamson's gross monthly 
income to be $1,643.00 at Bourns, although the court was not 
quite sure how that amount of income came up other than's Stuart 
Williamson's representations through his counsel. The court came 
up with a gross income for Joan Williamson in 1997 of $1,832.66 
gross per month, but accepted the figure of $1,692.56, including 
some overtime at Bourns, and Joan Williamson's second job where 
she earned $75.00 gross per month. R. 197 (Findings of Fact, 
paragraph 8, 9); T. page 181, lines 15-21. 
12 
17. After making its findings on the income of the parties, 
the trial court ruled: "I'm going to terminate alimony. Now to 
make this effective, and the Court paints this in broad strokes, 
I've often said that in the past and I'll reemphasize that here 
today." T. page 181, lines 22-25. 
18. Joan Williamson's attorney pressed the Court on the 
alimony issue, pointing out the $400.00 per month income 
disparity, to which the trial court finally responded that it was 
"close enough". T. page 184, lines 2-25; page 185; page 186, 
lines 1-2. 
19. The trial judge ordered a reduction in the payment of 
child support, effective the 1st of March, 1998, based on the 
gross incomes of Joan Williamson at $1,692.00 and Stuart 
Williamson at $2,090.00. T. page 180, lines 14-21; T. page 182, 
lines 9-11. 
20. The trial court accepted both parties' proffers of 
$1,500.00 attorneys fees and ordered each party to pay his/her 
own attorneys fees and costs. T. page 145, lines 15-23; page 
161, lines 9-16; R. 196-203; T. page 183, lines 1-2. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
I. The trial court did not commit error in failing to make 
findings on nearly all material issues, as there were sufficient 
findings by the trial court when supplemented with the facts in 
the record that were clear and uncontroverted to only support the 
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judgment or there is no mandate to make a finding of fact as to a 
particular issue as requested by the petitioner. The drafter 
(the petitioner) failed to draft appropriate findings. 
II. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
terminating alimony based on a substantial change in 
circumstances, as it appropriately considered the three mandated 
elements to determine alimony and the trial court attempted to 
equalize the parties' respective standards of living at this 
time, taking into consideration the large income reduction of 
Stuart Williamson due to no fault of his own. 
III. Joan Williamson is not entitled to attorneys fees or 
costs in the case at trial nor on appeal, as there was no abuse 
of discretion by the trial court where evidence that should have 
been proffered or given by Joan Williamson is not present. 
ARGUMENTS 
I. THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT ARE SUFFICIENT AS 
EITHER FOUND BY THE TRIAL JUDGE OR AS FOUND IN THE FACTS OF THE 
CASE TO SUPPORT THE JUDGMENT OF THE TRIAL COURT. 
The trial court's findings in this case are sufficient to 
support the judgment entered by the trial judge by themselves 
and/or by supplementing them with the facts of the case. In 
Whitehouse v. Whitehouser 790 P.2d 57 (Utah App. 1990), at page 
61, the court held that "Trial courts enjoy broad discretion in 
deciding whether a decree of divorce should be modified due to a 
substantial change of circumstances." The court also held in 
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Whitehouse that "the trial court must make findings on all 
material issues, and its failure to delineate what circumstances 
have changed and why these changes support the modification made 
in the prior divorce decree constitutes reversible error unless 
the facts in the record are clear, uncontroverted and only 
support the judgment." (Emphasis added.) 
A careful review of the facts in the record on each of the 
issues presented for review by Joan Williamson under 
subparagraphs IA, B, C, D, and E demonstrates that "the facts in 
the record are clear, uncontroverted and only support the 
judgment" to the point that even if this court finds that the 
trial court failed to make findings on all material issues, the 
ruling does not constitute reversible error and therefore the 
trial court's decision should be affirmed. 
IA. The Petitioner, at trial, requested that the court 
impute to Stuart Williamson his prior monthly income of $3,550.00 
from Morton International, Inc. for purposes of child support and 
alimony on the alleged basis that the respondent was voluntarily 
terminated or involuntarily terminated due to unsatisfactory job 
performance. 
The Utah Code Annotated § 78-45-7.6 (6) and (7) includes 
imputed income as gross income to a parent, but states as a 
condition of imputing income, that "Income may not be imputed to 
a parent unless the parent stipulates to the amount imputed or a 
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hearing is held and a finding made that the parent is voluntarily 
unemployed or underemployed*If If income is imputed based on a 
stipulation or finding by the court that the parent is 
voluntarily unemployed or underemployed then the imputed income 
shall be based upon employment potential and probable earnings, 
etc. as found in subsection (b). Without a stipulation between 
the parties as to imputed income, the court must have a hearing 
and make a finding of voluntary unemployment, or as alleged in 
this case, underemployment. See Griffith v. Griffith. 344 UAR 3 
(Utah Ct. App. 1998) and Hall v. Hall, 858 P.2d 1018 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1993). 
The trial court did not make a finding of underemployment. 
The court did find that the Kim Williamson's monthly income was 
$2,090.00. The statute does not require a finding that the 
respondent/parent was not underemployed, it only requires, in 
order to impute income, in this particular case, a finding of 
underemployment, which the trial court did not find. 
The record as cited is replete with testimony by the Stuart 
Williamson, and by Mr. Williamson's employer, of Stuart 
Williamson's ability to work and of his income at his current 
employment. There is also testimony by Kim Pitcher, as offered 
by the petitioner, of wages paid for similar work done. 
Testimony was given and proffered as to the respondent's 
termination from his previous employment with Morton. All of 
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this was considered by the trial court and no finding was made, 
as none had to be made, as to the Stuart Williamson's alleged 
underemployment. 
Subsection (c) of the statute imputes minimum wage if the 
parent has no work history, which is not applicable here, as the 
Mr. Williamson/parent was working and had a work history. 
Subsection (d) lists four reasons, not applicable here, in which 
income would not be imputed. 
The Order of the trial court on this issue should therefore 
be affirmed as there was no requirement of the trial court to 
make a finding of underemployment. 
IB. As argued, above in response to subparagraph IA of the 
petitioner's Issues Presented for Review, the trial court did not 
make a finding of voluntary underemployment as he did not have to 
if the trial judge was not going to impute income to Mr. 
Williamson. Also a careful review of the facts in the record are 
clear, uncontroverted and only support the judgment by the court 
on the issue of the alleged voluntary underemployment such that 
the Order of the trial court on this issue should be affirmed. 
IC. The petitioner on this issue for review is requesting 
that the trial court be found in error for failing to make 
findings on the effect of the Mr. Williamson's new spouse's 
contributions to the their household in considering Mr. 
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Williamson's needs and ability to pay alimony under the Utah Code 
Annotated §30-3-5 (7) (g) (iii). 
This statute states that "in determining alimony, the income 
of a subsequent spouse of the payor may not be considered, except 
as provided in this subsection. The exceptions to the rule of 
not considering a subsequent spouse's income are: (1) the 
subsequent spouse's financial ability to share living expense; or 
(2) the court may consider the income of a subsequent spouse if 
the court finds that the payor's improper conduct justifies that 
consideration. 
The trial court did not make a finding of fact as to the 
subsequent spouse's income as there was no requirement that such 
a finding be made, as the court did not consider that income. 
Mr. Williamson's current wife's income was never presented in 
evidence by either Joan Williamson or Stuart Williamson. Ms. 
Williamson's attorney questioned Mr. Williamson as to his current 
wife's employment in regard to insurance but failed to question 
him as to his current wife's income. T. page 76, line 22. 
In fact, Mr. Williamson in his Exhibit # 1 did, in 
calculating his expenses and income, deduct from his living 
expenses, in arriving at his expenses of $1,833.00, the sum of 
$600.00, which he attributed to his current wife as her share of 
the mortgage and utilities. 
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With these facts in the record there was no justifiable 
reason to consider or make a judicial finding as to a 
consideration of Mr. Williamson's current spouses's financial 
ability to share living expenses, as this was already done by the 
respondent in his Exhibit # 1. Nor was there a reason to 
consider the income of Mr. Williamson's current wife as there was 
not any improper conduct alleged on the part of Mr. Williamson to 
justify that consideration. 
ID. The court did make findings as to the parties' gross 
incomes and a review of the facts in the record, with the direct 
and cross-examination of each of the parties on their respective 
incomes, expenses, work history, health, questions of 
underemployment, and evidence of incomes at the time of the 
Divorce, marshals enough facts to show that the facts in the 
record are clear, uncontroverted and only support the judgment as 
a consideration of the parties' needs and respective abilities to 
meet those needs relative to alimony and an "equalization of the 
parties' respective standards of living. 
After the trial court ruled, Joan Williamson's counsel 
continued to argue with the trial judge as to a disparity in the 
parties' gross incomes of $400.00, $200.00 or $100.00 and the 
trial judge, in concluding and affirming his decision of a 
termination of alimony stated, "Well I appreciate your 
manipulation. But he's making $2,100.00, she's making $1,700.00. 
19 
He gives her $250.00, she gets $250.00. And he's $100.00 in the 
hole. That's the way the Court looks at it." T. page 185, lines 
19-23. The court considered the parties7 incomes and expenses 
and other obligations, as can be gleamed from the trial record, 
as required by law and ruled that alimony should terminate based 
on a substantial change in circumstances. The facts in the 
record are clear, uncontroverted and only support the judgment on 
this issue. 
Accordingly, the trial court did not commit error in failing 
to make findings on this issue of the appeal and the trial court 
should therefore be affirmed. 
IE. In interpreting U.C.A. §30-3-3(1), the Utah Supreme 
Court held as follows in Beardall v. Beardall, 629 P.2d 425 (Utah 
1981): 
Although there was no detailed presentation of facts 
establishing the usual requisite factors to support an award 
of attorney's fees, the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion in awarding attorneys fees to plaintiff to enable 
her to prosecute an action to enforce a provision of divorce 
decree where the facts implicit in the proceeding and the 
evidence necessarily presented to the trial court, together 
with the deminimis nature of the award, constituted a 
sufficient basis to sustain the exercise of the trial 
court's discretion. 
In this case, the trial court found that each party should 
pay their own attorneys fees and costs, such that it was not 
necessary to consider or rule on the reasonableness of Joan 
Williamson's attorneys fees and costs. There is no evidence by 
counsel as to the reasonableness of his attorneys fees or costs 
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nor was evidence specifically presented as to Joan Williamson's 
need for payment of the attorneys fees and costs by Mr. 
Williamson. 
But the facts in the record are replete with evidence as to 
the parties7 gross incomes and expenses and ability to pay for 
their obligations, including attorneys fees and costs. The facts 
in the record are clear, uncontroverted and only support the 
judgment such that the trial court's ruling that each party pay 
their own attorneys fees and costs should be affirmed under the 
analysis of Beardall. 
Although the Mr. Williamson's attorney was ordered to 
prepare the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order in 
this matter, Joan Williamson's attorney took it upon himself to 
prepare the documents and submit them to the court without Mr. 
Williamson's approval as to form and the pleading, accordingly, 
should be construed against the drafter. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT ERROR IN TERMINATING THE 
ALIMONY AWARD TO THE PETITIONER BASED ON THE FACTS OR STATUTORY 
AND JUDICIAL MANDATES. 
Due to no fault of Stuart Williamson, he lost his job 
earning $3,550.00 gross per month and had to return to a 
construction job, taping, similar to the one he had abandoned 
five years earlier, due to health and physical problems that are 
now only more pronounced. The involuntary change in employment 
and return to previous employment resulted in a drastic change in 
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income and lifestyle for Mr. Williamson. Stuart Kim Williamson 
is now required to do manual labor, resulting in numbness to his 
extremities on almost a daily basis, earning a little more than 
one half of his previous monthly income or the sum of $2,090.00 
as found by the court. In the meantime, Joan Williamson's income 
and lifestyle have increased, a fractionally amount, to just 
under $1,700.00 as found by the court, but based on her earnings 
of 1997, over $1,800.00 a month. 
Joan Williamson's expenses include those of the parties' 
minor child, and a contribution of about 14% of her income to a 
retirement fund for future use. T. page 160, lines 5-24. This 
retirement money could be used to pay Ms. Williamson's expenses, 
representing about $250.00 a month. Stuart Kim Williamson cashed 
out his ESIP retirement and paid one-half of that to Joan 
Williamson. T. page 160-161. Mr. Williamson has no retirement 
benefits nor any health insurance benefits through his current 
employer. 
In Whitehouse, at page 61, Id., this court found that "A 
court has continuing jurisdiction to modify a divorce decree. 
Cites omitted. However, a party requesting that a divorce decree 
be modified must demonstrate that there has been 'a substantial 
change of circumstances' occurring since the entry of the decree 
and not contemplated in the decree itself." The trial judge 
found a change in circumstances in favor of Mr. Williamson. 
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The Whitehouse case further held at page 61: 
The change necessary to justify a modification of a 
decree of divorce varies with the type of modification 
contemplated. Provisions dealing with alimony and child 
support are more susceptible to alteration at a later date 
because the needs that such provisions are intended to 
fulfill are subject to rapid and unpredictable change. 
The trial courts enjoy broad discretion in deciding whether 
a decree of divorce should be modified due to a substantial 
change of circumstances. See Jense v. Jense. 784 P.2d 1249 (Ct. 
App. 1989) 
Also "[I]t is well established that in divorces, trial 
courts are given considerable discretion in adjusting the 
parties7 financial and property interests, and their actions are 
entitled to a presumption of validity." Burnham v. Burnham, 716 
P.2d 781, 782 (Utah 1986); and Savage v. Savage, 658 P.2d 1201, 
1203 (Utah 1983). To overcome the presumption, the appealing 
party must demonstrate that "there was a misunderstanding or 
misapplication of the law resulting in substantial and 
prejudicial error; or the evidence clearly preponderated against 
the findings; or such a serious inequity has resulted as to 
manifest a clear abuse of discretion." See Ruhsam v. Ruhsam. 742 
P.2d 123, 124 (Utah App. 1987). 
In a case involving alimony the trial court is mandated to 
meet the requirements of Godfrey v. Godfreyf 854 P.2d 585, 589 
(Utah App. 1993) in considering the financial conditions and 
needs of the receiving spouse; the ability of the receiving 
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spouse to produce sufficient income; and the ability of the 
supporting spouse to provide support, and to the extent possible, 
to equalize the parties' respective standards of living." Not 
necessarily their respective gross or net incomes. 
As argued earlier, the facts in the record and the trial 
court's findings support the judgment of a termination of 
alimony. The trial record is replete with evidence as to Joan 
Williamson's conditions and needs. She set forth and testified 
as to her expenses and her ability to meet those expenses. 
Evidence was presented as to Joan Williamson's income or ability 
to produce sufficient income with the court's finding that she 
earned just under $1,700.00 gross per month, when in fact the 
trial court found that her gross income for the previous year was 
over $1,800.00 a month. 
There is considerable evidence as to Stuart Kim Williamson's 
gross income and a finding by the court that he makes $2,090.00 
gross per month including $200.00 in overtime pay. There was no 
income imputed to the respondent and no finding as to 
underemployment with the testimony of both Williamsons as to Mr. 
Williamson's income. There was testimony submitted and proffered 
as to Mr. Williamson's termination and the facts surrounding it 
by lead men that worked with him, which facts were not refuted. 
With all of this evidence, the court attempted with a 
finding of a substantial changes in circumstances to equalize the 
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parties7 respective standards of living. The trial court is not 
required to equalize the parties7 respective incomes, but to 
equalize, to the extent possible, taking into consideration the 
three elements of needs and income and ability to pay, their 
respective standards of living and maintain them at a level as 
close as possible to that standard of living enjoyed during the 
marriage. 
The court in its ruling, considered the parties7 standards 
of living. After extensive argument, by Joan Williamson7s 
counsel,, after the court7s ruling, the court explained that it 
had considered the incomes of the parties and found that with the 
payment of child support by Mr. Williamson to Ms. Williamson that 
Mr. Williamson was in the hole about $100.00 a month, if income 
disparity was considered in the manner that petitioner7s counsel 
was arguing the court should. Earlier in the court7s ruling, the 
trial judge held that considering the length of the marriage of 
24 years, that, "when you take into account the child support 
that [Stuart Williamson] would pay and that [Joan Williamson] 
would receive and their actual incomes, etcetera, the Court finds 
that7s close enough. The etcetera would have included a 
consideration of the parties7 expenses, ability to pay and 
incomes of the parties. 
25 
Accordingly, the alimony obligation was appropriately 
considered by the trial court under both the statutory and 
judicial mandates and terminated without abusing its discretion. 
III. JOAN WILLIAMSON IS NOT ENTITLED TO AN AWARD OF HER 
ATTORNEYS FEES AND COSTS FROM THE TRIAL NOR ON APPEAL. 
The Utah Code Annotated § 30-3-3 (1) allows the trial court 
to order a party to pay the costs, attorney fees, and witness 
fees of the other party to enable the other party to prosecute or 
defend the action and the order may include a provision for costs 
of the action. 
In applying this statute or in awarding attorneys fees and 
costs on the trial court level, the appellant courts have held 
that the decision to award attorney fees and the amount of 
attorneys fees, in divorce proceedings, rests primarily in the 
sound discretion of the trial court. However, the award must be 
based on evidence of both financial need and reasonableness. See 
Rasband v. Rasband. 752 P.2d 1331 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); Andersen 
v. Andersen, 757 P.2d 476 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); Morgan v. Morgan, 
795 P.2d 684 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); Crouse v. Crouse. 817 P.2d 836 
(Utah Ct. App. 1991); and Wilde v. Wilde. 357 UAR 29 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1998). In order to award attorney fees, the trial court 
must find the requesting party in need of financial assistance 
and that the fees requested are reasonable. Riche v. Riche, 784 
P.2d (Utah Ct. App. 1989); Bagshaw v. Bagshaw, 788 P.2d 1057 
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(Utah Ct. App. 1990); Haumont v. Haumont. 793 P.2d 421 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1990; and Wilde v. Wilde, 357 UAR 29 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). 
In deciding on an award of attorneys fees and costs, among 
other factors, the court may consider the difficulty of the 
litigation, the efficiency of the attorneys, the reasonableness 
of the number of hours spent on the case, the fee customarily 
charged in the locality, the amount involved in the case and the 
result attained, and the expertise and experience of the 
attorneys involved. None of this was testified to by Joan 
Williamson nor presented by her attorney. 
In Warren v. Warren, 655 P.2d 684 (Utah 1982), the Utah 
Supreme Court held that the trial court properly denied the 
wife's request for attorney fees in the divorce proceedings where 
she offered no evidence at trial to show the nature or amount of 
any attorney fees incurred or any need for court-ordered 
assistance in the payment of such fees. (Emphasis added). In 
Kallas v. Kallasf the Utah Supreme Court found it an abuse of the 
trial court's discretion to award attorney fees to the mother in 
a child custody modification proceeding where there was no 
presentation of facts establishing her financial need for such an 
award. 614 P.2d 641 (Utah 1980). 
The trial court accepted both parties' proffers of $1,500.00 
in attorneys fees and costs. No evidence was presented 
specifically, by either party as to the reasonableness of the 
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attorneys fees nor the financial need of Ms. Williamson for an 
award of attorneys fees and costs. Based on the evidence before 
the trial court, it found that each of the parties should pay 
their own attorneys fees and costs. 
As to an award of attorney fees and costs on appeal, this 
court in Wilde v. Wilde. 357 UAR 29, 31, exercised its discretion 
in awarding attorneys fees and costs on appeal because the 
defendant there had prevailed in large part on appeal. But in 
this case no attorneys fees nor costs have been awarded on the 
trial level, Mr. Williamson prevailed in large part on the trial 
level, no evidence has been detailed as to the need of Ms. 
Williamson as to attorneys fees and costs on appeal, such that no 
attorneys fees and costs should be awarded on appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court's judgment is sufficiently supported by the 
evidence of the case and his findings such that his ruling should 
be affirmed and no attorneys fees nor costs awarded unless they 
are awarded to Mr. Williamson on appeal. 
DATED this ) Y day of January, 1999. 
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